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When Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in
United States v. Davis' he probably thought he was bringing clarity
and certainty to an area of tax law that had been surrounded by
forty years of confusion.2 In spite of Davis and all subsequent case
law which has examined the dividend equivalency issue, however,
the precise implications of section 302(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code (the Code)3 have remained unclear, and consequently it has
served only a limited role as a tax planning vehicle. Indeed, several
commentators have suggested that Davis effectively eliminated sec-
tion 302(b)(1) from the Code.'
However, in spite of Davis and the efforts of the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) to increase the impact of Davis, section
302(b)(1) remains very much alive. The section's availability to the
contemporary corporate tax planner is the subject matter of this
note. It will attempt to ascertain the more significant particulars of
current section 302(b)(1) law by tracing the historical development
of this section of the Code and by analyzing those recent cases and
revenue rulings which give indications of the probable perimeters of
the Davis dividend equivalency test.
IU. BACKGROUND: SECTION 302(b)(1)'s RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CODE
Normally a shareholder is required to report the receipt of corpo-
rate distributions as ordinary dividend income to the extent of the
corporation's earnings and profits. 5 However, the Code provides for
1. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
2. See Crawford, The Section 302(b)(1) Redemption: Bringing Order to the Confusion, 28
J. TAx. 346 (1968); 43 TEx. L. REv. 755 (1965).
3. I.R.C. § 302 provides in pertinent part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning
of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies,
such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in ex-
change for the stock.
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.-
(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIVIDENDS.- Subsection
(a) shall apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
4. See, e.g., 22 BAYLoR L. REv. 429 (1970); 25 OKLA. L. Rxv. 301 (1972).
5. I.R.C. §§ 301 and 316 set forth the basic rules which govern the treatment of corporate
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exchange treatment under section 302(a) for stock redemptions that
satisfy the requirements of section 302(b) .6 The Code thus treats a
section 302(b) redemption as a return of capital to the extent of the
shareholder's basis in the stock, and provides for capital gain or loss
treatment for any excess or deficit under sections 1221 and 1222.
Redemptions which fail to satisfy the requirements of section 302(b)
are taxed as ordinary dividend income to the shareholder under
section 302(d).7
Usually a taxpayer will prefer exchange treatment over dividend
treatment because of the tax-free return of capital, as well as the
potential for long-term capital gain and the effective lower tax rate
on such gain provided by section 1202.8 Thus, a taxpayer will want
his redemption to fall under the provisions of section 302(b). Unless
the redemption comes within one of the "safe harbor" provisions of
this section, either as a complete termination of the shareholder's
interest under section 302(b)(3) or as a substantially dispropor-
tionate redemption under section 302(b)(2),' it will be tested for
exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1).'"
Section 302(b)(1) simply provides that exchange treatment is ex-
tended to a stock redemption if the redemption is "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend." The Treasury Regulations (the Regula-
tions) further stipulate that the determination of whether a redemp-
distributions to shareholders. See B. BIrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.01, at 7-2 (3d ed. 1971).
6. A redemption is defined in the Code as an acquisition by a corporation of "its stock
from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled,
retired, or held as treasury stock." I.R.C. § 317(b). Property is defined in the Code as "money,
securities, and any other property; except that such term does not include stock in the
corporation making the distribution (or rights to acquire such stock)." I.R.C. § 317(a). Both
definitions apply technically only to Part I of Subchapter C of the Code (§§ 301-318). See
I.R.C. § 317; Treas. Reg. § 1.317-1 (1960).
7. Such distributions in redemptions of stock are taxed as ordinary dividend income to
the distributee only to the extent that the distributing corporation has current or accumu-
lated earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316. If the distributing corporation has no
current or accumulated earnings and profits, such a distribution is treated as a return of basis,
and in this situation any excess is taxed as gain from the sale or exchange of property. I.R.C.
§ 301(c)(2)-(3).
8. See B. BrITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 9.20, at 9-9. Note, however, that a
corporate shareholder usually will prefer dividend treatment because of the 85% dividends
received deduction generally allowed corporations by I.R.C. § 243.
9. Note that the provisions of I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) are applicable only to voting stock.
Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962). It is obvious that without § 302(b)(1)
a substantially disproportionate redemption of nonvoting stock could never qualify for capital
gain treatment, as § 302(b)(2) is keyed only to changes in voting power. See Cornwall v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 736 (1967).
10. It should be noted that I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) also treats redemptions of stock as ex-
changes. The stock must have been issued by railroad corporations in certain reorganizations,
however, and thus this section is not relevant to the present discussion.
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tion is essentially equivalent to a dividend must be made according
to the facts and circumstances of each case."
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 302(b)(1)
In 1921, Congress enacted a statute imposing a tax on a share-
holder when the redemption of stock which was previously issued to
him as a dividend was deemed "essentially equivalent to the distri-
bution of a taxable dividend .. .'.I' Following amendments in
1924's and 1926,11 Congress codified the statute as section 115(g) in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.'5 In determining whether a stock
redemption was equivalent to a dividend under this Code section,
the courts applied the test of whether the net effect of the transac-
tion resembled more closely a dividend or a stock sale.' 6 (A signifi-
cant factor generally taken into account was whether the corpora-
tion had an authentic business reason for redeeming the stock.)' 7
Considerable confusion followed from this subjective test, however,
as it necessarily entailed a predominantly factual determination by
the court.
In drafting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the House of Rep-
resentatives sought to eliminate this confusion by striking the
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" language from the Code and
proposing the more objective guidelines that now compose sections
302(b)(2)-(4).' 8 The Senate Finance Committee, however, rein-
stated the dividend equivalency language, which became section
302(b)(1) of the 1954 Code, with the following explanation:
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960). The Regulations also state that as a general rule pro
rata redemptions of part of the stock probably will be construed to be essentially equivalent
to a dividend if the corporation has only one class of stock outstanding, as will redemptions
of all of one class of stock (except § 306 stock) if all classes of outstanding stock are held in
the same proportion. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1960). Note that when confronted with a series
of apparently related redemptions the courts in effect have viewed the redemptions as if they
had occurred at the same time and compared the stock ownership before the first redemption
with that after the last redemption. Bullock v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 276 (1956), aff'd per
curiam, 253 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1958); Boyle v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1382 (1950), aff'd, 187
F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
12. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 229 (current version at I.R.C. §
302(b)(1)).
13. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f), 43 Stat. 255 (current version at I.R.C. §
302(b)(1)).
14. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11 (current version at I.R.C. §
302(b)(1)).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48 (now I.R.C. § 302(b)(1)).
16. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); McGuire v. Commis-
sioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 591 (1936).
17. See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REV.
437, 468 (1950).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 302, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4060-62.
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While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which
stock may be redeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules appeared
unnecessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case of redemptions
of preferred stock which might be called by the corporation with-
out the shareholder having any control over when the redemption
may take place. Accordingly, your committee follows existing law
by reinserting the general language indicating that a redemption
shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in ex-
change for stock if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to
a dividend."
The Senate Report also stated that "[t]he test intended to be
incorporated in the interpretation of [section 302(b)(1)] is in gen-
eral that currently employed under section 115(g)(1) of the 1939
Code," but did not otherwise indicate the intended scope of section
302(b)(1). 20
The courts struggled with delineating the perimeters of section
302(b)(1)'s application. Eventually two separate lines of authority
arose from the cases. The more prevalent of these, prior to the year
1970, centered around the flexible net effect test, which held that
all of the various effects of the redemption should be examined in
ascertaining dividend equivalence. Included among these effects
were: (1) the presence or absence of a legitimate corporate business
purpose; (2) whether the distribution was in substance pro rata
among the shareholders; (3) whether a dividend distribution would
have given substantially the same result as the redemption; (4) the
prior dividend history of the corporation; (5) whether or not the
redemption resulted in a contraction of the corporate business; and
(6) whether the transaction resulted in a significant change in the
rights of the shareholder. The redeemed shareholder attempted to
prove that these and similar factors supported exchange treatment
for the redemption. 2'
The other line of authority, which governed a minority of the pre-
1970 cases, adhered to the strict net effect test. The Second Circuit
outlined this test in Himmel v. Commissioner. 2 The circuit court
therein defined a shareholder's interest to include: (1) the right to
vote and thereby exercise control; (2) the right to participate in
current earnings and accumulated surplus; and (3) the right to
share in net assets on liquidation. 2 The court then held that a
19. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4675.
20. Id. at 233-34, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4870.
21. See Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
22. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964).
23. Id. at 817. "Ownership of common stock generally involves all of these [rights, while]
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redemption is to be given exchange treatment if a substantial alter-
ation in these rights follows from the corporate distribution, but is
to be treated as a dividend distribution if it produces no significant
reduction of such rights.24 No other factors, particularly the exist-
ence of a legitimate corporate business purpose for the redemption,
have any relevance under the strict net effect test.
The Second Circuit's Himmel decision, based upon the applica-
tion of the strict net effect test, contrasted sharply with the deci-
sions of those circuits which, in applying the flexible net effect test,
held that the business purpose justification for the redemption was
a critical factor under the 1954 Code.25 To resolve the uncertainty
and confusion surrounding the issue, the Supreme Court, in 1970,
granted certiorari in United States v. Davis.
IV. THE Davis CASE
The taxpayer in Davis redeemed preferred stock for a price identi-
cal to the stock's basis and treated the corporate distribution as not
essentially equivalent to a dividend under the flexible net effect
test. The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding that the legitimate business
purpose underlying the entire transaction permitted the redemption
to be taxed as an exchange.26 The Supreme Court reversed. The
Court recognized the strict net effect test as the proper standard and
asserted that the existence of a business purpose for the distribution
was irrelevant.27 The Court then established the rule that, to qualify
for exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1), "a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's propor-
tionate interest in the corporation. 2 8 The Court did not proceed to
declare exactly what would normally constitute such a "meaningful
reduction," however, but instead left this task for the lower courts."9
Various cases and revenue rulings have subsequently addressed
ownership of preferred stock generally involves the last two, but only to limited extents,
unless otherwise provided." Id.
24. Id. Note that a distribution can be essentially equivalent to a dividend even though
the corporation has no earnings or profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1960).
25. See Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129 (1966); Sorem v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 206
(1963), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964). A listing of the
alignment of the circuits is provided in United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 303 n.2 (1970).
26. Davis v. United States, 408.F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
27. 397 U.S. at 312.
28. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
29. The Court did say that a partial redemption from a shareholder owning 100% of the
stock, whether owned directly or by attribution, does not constitute a meaningful reduction,
but is rather "always 'essentially equivalent to a dividend' within the meaning of that phrase
in § 302(b)(1). ... Id. at 307. Later cases have strictly adhered to this rule. See Johnson
v. United States, 434 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1970); Fireoved v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 133
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd in part & rev'd in part & remanded, 462 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1972).
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the issue. These cases and rulings are quite helpful from a tax plan-
ning standpoint. They can be accurately discussed, however, only
in light of the role played here by the attribution rules of Code
section 318.
V. ATrRIBUTION RULES OF SECTION 318
The Supreme Court stated in Davis that the attribution rules of
section 318(a) are to be applied to dividend equivalency determina-
tions under section 302(b)(1) .3 Thus a "meaningful reduction" is
often virtually impossible, particularly in close corporations when
family members whose stock would be attributed to the redeemed
shareholder continue to own a significant percentage of the corpo-
rate stock after the redemption, such that the redeemed shareholder
continues to own their stock constructively.3 '
Treasury Regulations section 1.302-2(b),"2 promulgated prior to
Davis, provides that the constructive stock ownership of a share-
holder is merely "one of the facts to be considered" in making the
determination of dividend equivalence. Also before Davis, Squier v.
Commissioner3 and Parker v. Commissioner34 both held that the
attribution rules would not be applied in a "family fight" situation
wherein there was no economic commonality of interest between, or
among, the related taxpayers.
After the Davis decision, the Tax Court held in Haft Trust v.
Commissioner that under Davis, the family attribution rules are to
operate "mechanically" in testing a redemption under section
302(b)(1). 3 However, the First Circuit reversed and remanded Haft
Trust to the Tax Court to determine whether family discord ac-
tually existed. 3
The Ninth Circuit has also characterized as unfair the application
30. 397 U.S. at 307. The Court stated that "the attribution rules of § 318(a) do apply...
for the purposes of deciding whether a distribution is 'not essentially equivalent to a dividend'
under § 302(b)(1) .... Id. The Court also believed "that Congress intended that they [the
rules of attribution] be taken into account wherever ownership of stock was relevant." Id.
31. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(1). The attribution rules of § 318 are also referred to as construc-
tive ownership rules. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, § 9.21, at 9-10. These rules
provide that stock owned by certain family members is considered to be owned by the
taxpayer.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
33. 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5.
34. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1961).
35. 61 T.C. 398, 403 (1973), vacated & remanded, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975). See also
Niedermeyer v. United States, 62 T.C. 280 (1974); Jones v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
T 9349 (D.C.N.J. 1972).
36. 510 F.2d at 48. The First Circuit noted that Davis "seems to permit, if it does not
mandate, an examination of the facts and circumstances to determine the effect of the
transaction .... " Id.
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of the attribution rules in instances of disharmony between family
members," as has at least one judge in the Eighth Circuit. :" The
other circuits will likely follow suit and allow flexibility in the appli-
cation of the attribution rules to discordant families involved in
section 302(b)(1) redemptions. It must be understood, however,
that the constructive ownership rules of section 318 fully apply to
all other section 302(b)(1) stock redemptions.
VI. PosT-Davis CASES AND RULINGS
The Supreme Court in Davis left unresolved two issues: (1) what
is a corporate interest; and (2) what is a meaningful reduction of a
shareholder's corporate interest? The first of these was later re-
solved when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the Commis-
sioner) recognized the stock ownership rights delineated by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Himmel and construed a shareholder's corporate in-
terest to include the following: (1) the right to vote, and thereby
exercise control; (2) the right to participate in current earnings and
accumulated surplus; and (3) the right to share in net assets on
liquidation.'0
The relative significance given to each of these rights in the deter-
mination of whether a redemption qualifies as a meaningful reduc-
tion is partially dependent upon the capital structure of any partic-
ular corporation, and partially dependent upon the individual
shareholder's percentage of the total outstanding issue of each class
of corporate stock." It is thus helpful to classify section 302(b)(1)
redemptions according to the interrelationship of these two varia-
bles.
A. Single-Issue Corporations (Redemptions of Common Stock)
1. Taxpayer has Complete Ownership
The Court stated in Davis that "a redemption [of shares from a
100% shareholder] is always 'essentially equivalent to a dividend'
within the meaning of that phrase in § 302(b)(1) . "... " This rule
eliminates any possibility of meaningful reduction for a sole share-
37. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. United States, 484 F.2d 462, 465 (9th Cir. 1973).
38. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 612 (8th Cir. 1973) (Bright, J., dissenting).
39. Several commentators have supported this point of view. See, e.g., 55 B.U.L. Rv.
667 (1975); 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 195 (1975).
40. Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Rev. Rul. 75-502,
1975-2 C.B. 111.
41. In speaking of the number or percentage of shares owned by a shareholder, it is
hereafter presumed that the attribution rules of § 318 have been applied.
42. 397 U.S. at 307 (footnote omitted).
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holder. The courts have followed it consistently. 3
The Service has even used the Davis sole shareholder rule to
declare section 302(b)(1) inapplicable to estates selling all of dece-
dent's stock if the estate constructively owns all of the remaining
stock." This Service position is difficult to accept, considering that
the Supreme Court's intent was to prevent a shareholder from re-
taining effective control of a corporation (through stock owned by
relatives) after redeeming his shares at capital gains rates. Ob-
viously neither a deceased person nor his estate can retain effective
control.
2. Taxpayer Has Majority Ownership
In a single-issue corporation, all the rights which constitute a
shareholder's corporate interest must necessarily exist in proportion
to the percentage of shares held. Thus, the courts have almost invar-
iably held reduction of voting power45 to be the determinative factor
in meaningful reduction, majority ownership cases.4" The only rele-
vant issue of controversy is the precise amount of control over the
corporation which the majority shareholder must lose.
In Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commissioner47 taxpayer suffered a 10%
reduction in voting control, from 98% ownership, directly and con-
structively, to 88%, solely by attribution. The Tax Court deter-
mined that no meaningful reduction had occurred, as the taxpayer's
control of the corporation remained essentially unaltered." The
court clearly stated, however, that a 10% reduction may constitute
a meaningful alteration if the initial percentage of control were not
so high.49 The Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal. 50
In Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. United States, 5' the corporation
redeemed all of the shares held by three separate trusts, but each
trust continued to constructively own 100% of the corporate stock.
43. See Johnson v. United States, 434 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1970); Maher v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 441 (1970), modified, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972); Estate of Runnels v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 762 (1970).
44. Rev. Rul. 71-261, 1971-1 C.B. 108.
45. In a corporation with only one class of stock outstanding, voting power, of course,
always correlates directly with the percentage of shares held.
46. See Moloney v. United States, 521 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017
(1975); Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. United
States, 326 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973); Sawelson v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 109 (1973).
47. 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938
(1974).
48. 58 T.C. at 185. See also 487 F.2d at 187.
49. 58 T.C. at 185.
50. 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973).
51. 326 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
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The district court and the Ninth Circuit both determined that the
redemption did not result in a meaningful reduction. The Tax Court
has also held that a redemption can never qualify for exchange
treatment under section 302(b)(1) if it results in an increase in the
redeeming shareholder's proportionate interest, even if such in-
crease is attributable solely to the application of the rules of con-
structive ownership. 52
The taxpayer in Jones v. United States53 again constructively
retained full control when the stock redemption reduced his interest
from 98% to 96%. The court found that "ownership of such a vast
majority of corporate stock precludes a finding that plaintiffs' at-
tributed interest had been meaningfully reduced .... ."I' Likewise,
in Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 55 the Tax Court held that a reduc-
tion from 90% to 83% was not meaningful, as taxpayer's control over
the corporation was essentially unaltered." A similar rationale was
applied in Estate of Runnels v. Commissioner when taxpayers con-
structively owned 100% of the corporation's stock following the re-
demption.57
Not all of the majority shareholder single-issue corporation cases
have been decided against the taxpayer. The Eighth Circuit held in
Wright v. United States58 that a redemption which reduced tax-
payer's stock ownership interest from 85% to 62% constituted a
meaningful reduction. Although taxpayer was still in a majority
position, he could no longer effect certain changes, such as corporate
liquidation, consolidation, merger, or amendment of the articles of
incorporation. Under Arkansas law all of these changes required a
two-thirds vote, which taxpayer had relinquished.8 The court con-
cluded that he had thus lost a meaningful portion of his corporate
control60
The district court in Shimberg v. United States' closely followed
the reasoning of the Wright court. A statutory merger, involving an
52. Sawelson v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 109 (1973).
53. 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9349 (D.N.J. 1972).
54. Id. at 84,212.
55. 62 T.C. 280 (1974).
56. Id. at 287-88. The court asserted that "lAin 82.96-percent interest clearly is sufficient
to dominate and control the policies of the corporation." Id.
57. 54 T.C. 762 (1970).
58. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); accord, Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D.
La. 1976).
59. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. Id. The dissenting judge believed the redemption only reduced taxpayer's ownership
interest to 72%, which would have no practical effect on his control over the corporation. Id.
at 611.
61. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976); rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979).
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exchange of stock for stock and cash, reduced taxpayer's ownership
interest from 66% to less than 1%. The court held that a meaningful
reduction had occurred, as the transaction had virtually extin-
guished taxpayer's voting control."2
The Commissioner's position regarding redemptions of majority
stockholders is similar to that of the courts. In Revenue Ruling 75-
50263 a reduction of stock ownership from 57% to 50% was held to
be meaningful. Taxpayer's loss of control over the corporation was
the factor which most significantly affected the Commissioner's de-
termination."
3. Taxpayer Has a Minority Interest
Reduction in shareholder control remains a very relevant issue in
redemptions of stock held by minority shareholders who exercise
significant voting control over the affairs of the corporation. In Rev-
enue Ruling 76-36461 taxpayer owned 27% of the common stock of
the corporation and three unrelated individuals owned the remain-
ing 73%. The Commissioner held that a redemption which reduced
taxpayer's portion to 22% constituted a meaningful reduction. The
ruling noted the substantial reduction in the taxpayer's right to
vote, right to earnings, and right to share in net assets on liquida-
tion. The Commissioner considered especially significant the fact
that the redemption "caused [taxpayer] to go from a position of
holding a block of [the corporation's] stock that afforded
[taxpayer] control of [the corporation] if [taxpayer] acted in
concert with only one other stockholder, to a position where such
action was not possible."6 Revenue Ruling 76-364 strongly suggests
that a minority shareholder with a significant voting interest can
qualify for a 302(b)(1) redemption only if he sustains a practical
reduction in his voting control as a result of the redemption.
A minority shareholder who has never exercised any significant
amount of control over the corporation stands a much better chance
of being accorded section 302(b)(1) treatment. In Revenue Ruling
75-51217 a redemption reduced a trust's ownership interest in the
62. 415 F. Supp. at 836.
63. 1975-2 C.B. 111.
64. The last paragraph of the ruling states:
If in the instant case, the stock of X held by the estate was reduced by less than
7 percentage points the redemption would not qualify under section 302(b)(1) be-
cause the estate would continue to have dominant voting rights in X by virtue of
its ownership of more than 50 percent of the X stock.
Id. at 112.
65. 1976-2 C.B. 91.
66. Id. at 92.
67. 1975-2 C.B. 112.
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corporation's outstanding stock from 30% to 24%. The Commis-
sioner noted that the trust was a minority shareholder that took no
part in the management of the corporation, and ruled that the
trust's 19% reduction in "its voting rights, its right to participate
in current earnings and accumulated surplus, and its right to share
in net assets on liquidation" was significant enough to be regarded
as meaningful. 8 The Commissioner failed to discuss, however, the
extent to which a reduction would qualify as meaningful if the tax-
payer's previous ownership interest is reduced by less than 19%.
The Service readdressed that issue a year later in Revenue Ruling
76-385.61 In this ruling a redemption reduced taxpayer's ownership
interest from .0001118% of the corporation's outstanding stock to
.0001081%. The Commissioner ruled that this 3.3% decrease consti-
tuted a meaningful reduction.
Revenue Ruling 76-385 noted that the taxpayer had experienced
a reduction of its voting rights, its rights to earnings, and its rights
to share in assets upon liquidation.70 Furthermore, it had held
minimal stockholdings and had exercised no control over the corpo-
rate affairs. The Commissioner emphasized that in enacting section
302(b)(1) Congress intended to provide capital gains treatment for
redemptions which involve "a minority shareholder whose relative
stock interest in [the corporation] is minimal and who exercises no
control over the affairs of [the corporation]."' Revenue Ruling 76-
385 may be interpreted as holding, although it does not specifically
take this position, that the Service is willing to always allow ex-
change treatment for redemptions of stock held by shareholders who
exercise no meaningful control over the corporate affairs, so long as
the shareholder's percentage ownership is reduced.
B. Multiple-Issue Corporations (Redemptions of Preferred Stock)
The issuance of both common and preferred stock compounds the
difficulties of determining what constitutes a shareholder's interest
in a corporation and what qualifies as a meaningful reduction of an
interest. The "interest equals voting power" equation no longer suf-
fices, as voting and economic rights are generally distributed un-
evenly among the various classes of stock.
A redemption of a shareholder's common stock in a multi-class
corporation is generally treated as though it were from a single-issue
corporation, i.e., such a redemption satisfies the Davis test if it
68. Id. at 113.
69. 1976-2 C.B. 92.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id.
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would have resulted in a meaningful reduction had only the com-
mon stock been outstanding. The treatment extended to a redemp-
tion of preferred stock is almost invariably dependent upon the
shareholder's common stock ownership position." Thus preferred
stock redemptions are classified according to the shareholder's per-
centage ownership of the corporation's common stock outstanding
just as common stock redemptions are classified.
1. Taxpayer Has Complete Ownership of Corporation's Com-
mon Stock
A taxpayer who owns 100% of a corporation's common stock suf-
fers no loss of corporate control in the partial or total redemption of
his nonvoting preferred stock. Thus the Supreme Court ruled in
Davis that when a shareholder owns all of the voting stock outstand-
ing, a redemption of any amount of preferred stock can never result
in a meaningful reduction of his corporate interest.73 The lower
courts have followed this rule without deviation."
2. Taxpayer Has Majority Ownership of Corporation's Common
Stock
The Supreme Court in Davis clearly did not adopt the Second
Circuit's two-part definition of a dividend, i.e., a pro rata distribu-
tion and no change in the basic shareholder relationships, found in
Himmel. Rather, the Court ignored the pro rata aspect of a dividend
distribution, and instead defined a distribution as being essentially
equivalent to a dividend whenever it does not effect a meaningful
reduction in the shareholder's proportionate corporate interest.
The Tax Court has since held that, under this Davis meaningful
reduction test, the redemption of some or all of a majority share-
holder's preferred stock must result in an alteration in the basic
shareholder relationships, particularly a reduction in the redeemed
shareholder's voting control, in order to escape dividend treatment.
Consequently, a redemption of a controlling shareholder's nonvot-
ing preferred stock can never qualify for exchange treatment under
section 302(b)(1), even if it is a non-pro-rata redemption, since it
would not affect taxpayer's control over business decisions.
72. The only situations in which the shareholder's common stock ownership position does
not necessarily control are those where the corporation's capital structure includes voting
preferred stock. In such instances, redemptions of preferred stock can reduce the share-
holder's voting control even though his common stock ownership position remains the same.
73. 397 U.S. at 307. The Supreme Court held in Davis that "such a redemption is always
'essentially equivalent to a dividend' within the meaning of that phrase in § 302(b)(1) .
Id.
74. See Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084 (1976). "[T]he retention of absolute
voting control in the present case outweighs any other consideration." Id. at 1111.
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Thus, in Hays v. Commissioner" the Tax Court found a non-pro-
rata redemption of 10% of a majority shareholder's preferred stock
as essentially equivalent to a dividend. Since the redeeming share-
holder continually owned 80% of the common stock, he suffered no
loss of voting rights, and thus there was no meaningful reduction of
his proportionate interest in the corporation.
Likewise, in Brown v. United States6 the non-pro-rata redemp-
tion of preferred stock did not result in a meaningful reduction of
the redeemed shareholder's proportionate interest (even though the
redemption did result in a change in rights to current earnings),
since the shareholder retained ownership of 99% of the voting com-
mon stock and thus lost no corporate control. The district court here
expressly rejected Himmel if under the rule of that case a different
result would have ensued.
Similarly, in Grabowski Trust v. Commissioner" the Tax Court
stated that compliance with the Himmel formula does not mean the
facts would necessarily satisfy the meaningful reduction test of
Davis. The court held that a redemption of preferred stock which
completely terminated the shareholder's direct interest in the corpo-
ration, without a significant decrease in the shareholder's construc-
tive majority in the common stock, did not qualify as a meaningful
reduction of taxpayer's corporate interest."8 It is quite apparent
that, when testing redemptions of preferred stock held by majority
common stock shareholders for section 302(b)(1) exchange treat-
ment, the courts regard continued control of the corporation
through ownership of the common stock as the controlling factor.
3. Taxpayer Has Minority Ownership of Corporation's Common
Stock
The rule governing redemptions of preferred stock held by major-
ity shareholders also applies to redemptions of such stock owned by
minority shareholders who exercise substantial control over the cor-
porate affairs. A redemption of preferred stock, therefore, qualifies
as a meaningful reduction of a controlling minority shareholder's
corporate interest only if it results in a practical reduction in his
control over the corporation. A redemption of a controlling minority
shareholder's nonvoting preferred stock thus can never qualify for
section 302(b)(1) exchange treatment, since such a redemption in
75. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 378 (1971).
76. 345 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mem., 477 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
77. 58 T.C. 650 (1972).
78. Id. at 659.
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no way diminishes the shareholder's voting control. Several cases
exemplify this point.
In Miele v. Commissioner" five taxpayers, each with "substantial
control," owned preferred stock and virtuallfy all of the common
stock in a corporation. The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
determination that a redemption of the preferred stock was essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend, as it failed to change the relative
rights or interests of each of the five taxpayers.
The Tax Court reached a similar conclusion in Furr v.
Commissioner," when taxpayer owned 24.19% of the common stock
before a preferred stock redemption and 23.86% afterward. Like-
wise, the Tax Court extended dividend treatment in Furr v.
Commissioner"' to a taxpayer who owned 41.2% of the common
stock before a preferred stock redemption and 39.5% following the
redemption.
Minority shareholders who hold no controlling interest have fared
much better in redemptions of preferred stock. The more favorable
treatment is appropriate. As the Supreme Court noted in Davis,
Congress enacted section 302(b)(1) in order to extend exchange
treatment to "redemptions of preferred stock which might be called
by the corporation without the shareholder having any control over
when the redemption may take place."8 2 Furthermore, since voting
control cannot be meaningfully reduced, the Davis test is necessar-
ily satisfied if the redemption reduces the shareholder's rights to
earnings and to net assets on liquidation.
The Service partially indicated its position with regard to re-
demptions of preferred stock held by minority shareholders who
exercise no control over the corporation in Revenue Ruling 74-515.13
This ruling involved a non-pro-rata redemption of preferred stock
held by a group of shareholders who each owned less than 1% of the
corporation's common stock. The Commissioner ruled that the re-
demption resulted in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's
corporate interest and thus qualified for section 302(b)(1) treatment
under Davis, since none of the redeemed shareholders had exercised
any form of control over the corporation. The legislative history of
section 302(b)(1), as noted directly above and as cited in Davis,"4
79. 56 T.C. 556 (1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Albers
v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982 (1973).
80. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1975).
81. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1975).
82. 397 U.S. at 310 (quoting S. REI. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in [1954]
U.S. 'CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4675).
83. 1974-2 C.B. 118.
84. See note 82 supra.
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indicates that the Commissioner should rule the same way even in
cases where the redemption of preferred stock is pro rata with re-
spect to common ownership.
In Agway, Inc. v. United States,8 5 the taxpayer owned 6% of the
voting stock and 18% of the nonvoting preferred stock of a corpora-
tion. He exercised no significant control over the business. The court
treated a partial redemption of his preferred as an exchange, noting
that the transaction had reduced taxpayer's rights to earnings and
to net assets on liquidation.
The holding of Agway is essentially the rule which governs re-
demptions of preferred stock owned by taxpayers who exercise no
control over the business of the corporation. A decrease in voting
power or corporate control is never required. A reduction in propor-
tionate rights to earnings and rights to net assets on liquidation is
helpful, but not essential as long as the Service adheres to the con-
gressional intent behind section 302(b)(1). The Service has not thus
far challenged exchange treatment for proceeds from these redemp-
tions.
4. Taxpayer Owns None of the Corporation's Common Stock
Revenue Ruling 74-51511 suggests that the Commissioner is willing
to extend exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1) to the com-
plete redemption of a shareholder who owns only preferred stock. In
Cummins Diesel Sales Corp. v. United States87 the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's determination that a.redemption of a
taxpayer who holds only preferred stock qualifies for section
302(b)(1) exchange treatment even if it does not completely termi-
nate the taxpayer's interest.
In Revenue Ruling 77-426 s8 the Commissioner essentially adopted
the holding of Cummins Diesel, stating "the redemption of any
amount of stock that is nonvoting, nonconvertible, and limited and
preferred as to dividends and in liquidation represents a meaningful
reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion if the shareholder does not own stock of any other class, either
directly or indirectly."89 The rulings and cases clearly indicate that
a redemption from a shareholder owning only nonvoting preferred
stock will virtually always constitute a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest, and thus qualify for exchange
treatment under section 302(b)(1).
85. 524 F.2d 1194 (Ct. C1. 1975).
86. 1974-2 C.B. 118.
87. 323 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1972).
88. 1977-2 C.B. 87.
89. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
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VII. SUMMARY OF POST-Davis CASES AND RULINGS
The Supreme Court stated in Davis that dividend equivalency
exists unless the redeemed shareholder has incurred a meaningful
reduction in his proportionate corporate interest. According to
Davis, the courts must apply a strict net effect test to determine if
such a meaningful reduction has taken place. This test, by subse-
quent order of the Commissioner and the courts, is concerned al-
most exclusively with reductions in the redeemed shareholder's vot-
ing rights (particularly if the shareholder exercises any form of con-
trol over the corporation), rights to earnings and accumulated sur-
plus, and rights to net assets on liquidation. The courts also take
into account the congressional intent underlying section 302(b)(1)
in those situations in which the redeemed shareholder has exercised
no corporate control. The constructive ownership rules of section 318
fully apply, except in family hostility situations.
Two prevailing rules have evolved from the post-Davis meaning-
ful reduction cases and rulings. The first is that if a shareholder
exercises any form of control over the affairs of the redeeming corpo-
ration, a redemption of his stock will qualify for section 302(b)(1)
exchange treatment if, and only if, it results in his experiencing a
significant reduction in his corporate control.9° This rule applies
whether the shareholder holds a majority or minority interest,' and
whether the corporation redeems common or preferred stock."
The second rule is that if the shareholder exercises no practical
control over the corporation, a redemption of his stock will qualify
for section 302(b)(1) treatment regardless of any other factors.13 This
rule as well applies whether the corporation redeems common or
preferred stock."
VIII. CIRCUMVENTION OF Davis: THE ESOP
Tax planners have found a way by which, in certain circumstan-
ces, the construction of Davis may be avoided. The scheme involves
the use of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).
The ESOP, which is used as an employee retirement income secu-
rity device, is a defined contribution"5 type of stock bonus plan." It
90. See section VI.A.2. supra.
91. See section VI.A.3. supra.
92. See sections VI.B.2., 3. supra.
93. See sections VI.A.3., B.3., 4. supra.
94. See section VI.B.4. supra.
95. I.R.C. § 414(i) defines a defined contribution plan as follows:
(i) Defined contribution plan.-For purposes of this part, the term "defined
contribution plan" means a plan which provides for an individual account for each
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is designed to invest primarily in employer securities. 7 The most
advantageous characteristic of an ESOP is that the attribution rules
of section 318, which can so easily trigger dividend equivalency
under Davis, do not apply to such a stock bonus plan."
A corporation may wish to set up an ESOP trust and fund it with
deductible contributions of cash. So long as the corporation's stock
is not publicly traded, the plan can provide that none of the corpora-
tion's stock held by the trust will be voted. Stockholders of the
corporation could then sell any amounts of the corporation's stock
to the trust and realize capital gains upon the sales rather than
ordinary income. Section 302 would not enter the picture.
The value of an ESOP in circumventing Davis may best be ex-
plained with an example. Suppose A owns 100% of the common
stock of X Corporation, a single-issue corporation with a going con-
cern value of $2,000,000, and that X Corporation has $250,000 cash
on hand. A could have X Corporation redeem 10% of his stock for
$200,000, but he would then realize ordinary income under Davis
and section 302(b)(1). On the other hand, X Corporation, at A's
direction, could set up an ESOP, have the plan provide that none
of the corporation's stock held by the ESOP trust will be voted, and
fund the trust with deductible contributions totaling $200,000. A
could then sell 10% of his stock to the trust for $200,000, either all
at one time or in installments over a span of years. The sale would
be treated as a normal sale of stock, such that A would realize
capital gain rather than ordinary income. At the same time, A
would retain 100% control of the corporation. The trust would hold
the stock until the time came for it to make payments to employees,
which it would do in such fashion as would be provided in the plan.
participant and for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to the partici-
pant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of
accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's ac-
count.
96. See I.R.C. § 401.
97. I.R.C. § 409A(a).
98. An ESOP falls within the category of an employee's trust described in § 401(a) which
is exempt from tax under § 501(a). See I.R.C. §§ 401(a) and 501(a). I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B)(i)
provides that: "Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a trust (other than an employee's
trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a)) shall be
considered as owned by its beneficiaries in proportion to the actuarial interest of such benefi-
ciaries in such trust."
I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B)(i) provides in part that:
Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a beneficiary of a trust (other than
an employee's trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under
section 501(a)) shall be considered as owned by the trust, unless such beneficiary's
interest in the trust is a remote contingent interest.
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IX. CONCLUSION
When Davis came before the Supreme Court in 1970 most courts
regarded the existence of a legitimate business purpose underlying
a stock redemption as a very important, if not the most important,
consideration in the determination of whether the redemption was
essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1). The
Supreme Court held that business purpose was an irrelevant factor,
and asserted that to qualify for section 302(b)(1) exchange treat-
ment a redemption must result in a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. The lower
courts and the Commissioner then struggled to define what consti-
tuted a "meaningful reduction" and a "proportionate interest," as
the Supreme Court had given little indication of the implications
of these expressions.
Several justices dissenting in the denial of certiorari in Albers v.
Commissioner9 expressed doubt as to whether Davis was correctly
decided. The three dissenting Albers justices, similarly to the three
dissenters in Davis, viewed Davis as eliminating section 302(b)(1)
from the Code under the mechanical approach of never examining
the business purpose of the transaction. 00 The Service subsequently
issued a number of revenue rulings in which redemptions did qualify
for exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1).10'
At present, the taxpayer can derive several general rules from the
post-Davis cases and rulings, and thus utilize section 302(b)(1) as
an effective tax planning tool in some situations. Significant contro-
versy and uncertainty continue to cloud this section of the Code,
however, and the entire dividend equivalency issue may still require
ultimate settlement by the Supreme Court.
In spite of all that may be said about section 302(b)(1) and divi-
dend equivalency, the contemporary corporate tax planner does
have the option to avoid the far-reaching effects of Davis altogether.
Congress has enabled him to do so by specifically providing that
stock held by qualified stock bonus plans, such as ESOP's, may not
99. 414 U.S. 982 (1973).
100. Ironically, the Albers bench probably would have approved the business purpose
approach if the issue were one of first impression. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan,
who both dissented in Davis, apparently regarded stare decisis as now controlling, and thus
failed to dissent in Albers. Had they stood by their Davis convictions, they would have joined
Albers dissenting Justices Powell and Blackmun, who were not on the Supreme Court when
Davis was decided, and Douglas. The five of them would have constituted a majority.
101. See Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92; Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 75-
512, 1975-2 C.B. 112; Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111. These post-Albers rulings suggest
that the Service decided to relax its strict application of section 302(b)(1)'s "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" language to appease the Albers dissenters rather than run the risk
that the Supreme Court would modify Davis.
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be constructively owned by anyone under the attribution rules of
section 318. Thus, the purchase of stock by an ESOP will never
trigger dividend equivalency. The taxpayer facing Davis should con-
sider the value of an ESOP, as sales of stock to such a plan are sure
to yield capital gains rather than ordinary income.

